

# JEAN MONNET CHAIR EUROPEAN MIGRATION STUDIES

## ECONOMICS OF MIGRATION IN EUROPE (ECMEU)

REPORTS PRESENTATION

COUNTRY: SWEDEN

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**UNIVERSITÀ  
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# **COUNTRY REPORT: SWEDEN**

**A.A. 2022/23**



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## INTRODUCTION

The objective of this report is to analyse in depth the migration phenomenon in Sweden. For this purpose, data available on the Eurostat platform were used. Our investigation is based on available data from 2013 to 2023, otherwise we selected the most relevant and recent data in this decade.

Sweden's global approach ranks high in the MIPEX "Top Ten"<sup>1</sup>, within the international Top 3. Sweden scores 86 points on the 100-point MIPEX scale, while the average MIPE country scores only 49/100. A comprehensive approach to integration ensures equal rights, opportunities, and long-term security for both newcomers and citizens.

Sweden's comprehensive approach to integration is very similar to Canada, Finland, and Portugal and more inclusive than the other Nordic countries. Compared to Finland, Swedish policies are slightly more advanced on health and access to nationality but slightly less inclusive on political participation and permanent residence.

The MIPEX "Top Ten" countries treat immigrants as equals and invest in their integration as an opportunity. In Sweden, integration works as policies that encourage the public to see immigrants as their peers, neighbours, and potential citizens.

These policies are important because the way governments treat immigrants strongly influences how immigrants and the public interact and think about each other. Based on research carried out by MIPEX, integration policies emerge as one of the strongest factors shaping not only the public's willingness to accept and interact with immigrants, but also the attitudes, belonging, participation, and even health of immigrants in their new home country. Under inclusive policies such as Sweden's, both immigrants and the public enjoy similar levels of positive attitudes, awareness of discrimination, life satisfaction, trust in society, and belonging in their new home country.

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
<sup>1</sup> *Migrant Integration Policy Index | MIPEX 2020*, <https://www.mipex.eu/sweden>. Accessed 14 April 2023

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## 1. Stock total population

Starting from the first section, in the following graph, we can see that, despite a slight majority of females from 2011 until 2014, we can see a slight majority of males from 2016 onwards. Nevertheless, we can affirm that the population is distributed almost equally and there is not a large gap between the two sexes.



Source: EUROSTAT [DEMO\_PJAN\_\_custom\_5798975]

## 2. Stock of migrants in the last 10 years

Considering the fact that we are willing to analyse the stock of migrants in the last 10 years (on January the 1st), we have to add other columns to our table, regarding the event of Brexit. As we can see, Eurostat offers data according to the period of pre- and post- Brexit.

If our aim is to calculate the stock of international migrants residing in Sweden in the last 10 years, we must consider the data about foreign country nationals present in the destination

country on the 1st of January of each year. According to the “Push-Pull model”, migration is a result of economic, political, and social factors.

The following table and graph illustrate the stock of foreign-born population living and residing in Sweden from 2013 to 2022. As we can see, the graph confirms a continuous and constant growth trend reaching the highest number of foreign-born inhabitants in 2022.

If we observe the 2022 datas (Stock of foreign born population on January the 1st), the share of foreign population on the total population is 19,98%, with 14,87% for foreigners from Non-EU 27 countries and 5,11% for foreigners from EU 27 countries.


As we can observe from the table and from the graph, the stock foreigner population from non-Eu countries in the last 10 years is always higher than the stock of foreign population from Eu countries.

C_BIRTH (Labels)	C_BIRTH (Labels)2	Total Population	EU 27 Countries (from 2020) Except reporting country	EU 28 Countries (from 2013 to 2020) Except reporting Country	NON-EU 27 Countries (from 2020) Except reporting Country	NON-EU 28 Countries (from 2013 to 2020) Except reporting Country
GEO (Labels)	TIME					
Sweden	2013	9.555.893	:	:	:	:
Sweden	2014	9.644.864	:	509.601	:	1.022.962
Sweden	2015	9.747.355	:	519.215	:	1.083.307
Sweden	2016	9.851.017	:	529.841	:	1.145.275
Sweden	2017	9.995.153	513.961	540.403	1.269.218	1.242.776
Sweden	2018	10.120.242	522.910	550.595	1.352.727	1.325.042
Sweden	2019	10.230.185	528.661	557.637	1.425.404	1.396.428


<b>Sweden</b>	<b>2020</b>	10.327.589	531.939	561.918	1.486.252	1.456.273
<b>Sweden</b>	<b>2021</b>	10.379.295	529.899	:	1.515.335	:
<b>Sweden</b>	<b>2022</b>	10.452.326	534.399	:	1.554.609	:

Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_POP3CTB\_\_custom\_5799215]

## Foreign born population on January 1st



Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_POP3CTB\_\_custom\_5799644]




Source EUROSTAT [MIGR\_POP3CTB\_custom\_5799215]



### 3. Immigrant stock by category (sex, age, country of birth, reason for migration)


Firstly, we analysed the immigrant stock in Sweden by category of sex



Source: EUROSTAT [migr\_imm3ctb]

As we can see on the graph, the EUROSTAT database reveals an immigrant stock of 79.967 people, distributed in 41.007 males and 38.960 females, therefore there is a short difference between the two sexes. These informations have been found using the label [migr\_imm3ctb] and selecting “Foreign Country” as country of birth, “Sweden” as reporting country, both sexes and “2021” as time.


Secondly, we analysed the immigrant stock in Sweden by category of **age**.



Source: EUROSTAT [migr\_imm3ctb]

As we can see on the graph, the EUROSTAT database reveals that most immigrants are relatively young. They are mostly between 20 and 39 years old. Moreover, another relevant data is the high number of minors under 19, which is 19,750. So, as we can see in the graph, after the peak of 30-39, there's a negative correlation between age and number of immigrants.


Thirdly, we analysed the immigrant stock in Finland by category of **country of birth**. We looked before at the European community and then at the singular states or continents.



Source: EUROSTAT [migr\_imm3ctb]

As we can see on the graph, we have researched where most of the immigrants in Sweden come from and we have found that most of them aren't European. Unfortunately, the number of immigrants from EU 28 countries (2013-2022) wasn't available, therefore we used the number from EU27 countries (2020).


Then we researched which were the sending countries and continents with the largest number of emigrants in Sweden and we discovered that they are Asia with 26.446 people and Africa with 8.341.



Source: EUROSTAT [migr\_imm3ctb]

Lastly, we analysed the immigrant stock in Sweden by category of **reasons for migration**. We analysed the label [migr\_resvalid] and considered the stock on 31 December 2021, because there was no data for the year 2022.


### Immigrant Stock by Reasons of Migration on January 31,2021 Sweden



Source: EUROSTAT [migr\_resvalid]

This graph shows the reasons for the migration of 517.541 people now legally based in Sweden. As we can see the major reasons to migrate were family (251.691) and refugee status (87.481). Then, employment reasons (66.130), subsidiary protection status (50.430), other reasons (37.775) and education reasons (24.034).

Finally, we focused on the **reasons for migration** from **Morocco, Afghanistan, Iran and Ukraine**. For this analysis we chose to focus not on the total of the reasons of all migrants currently in Sweden, but only on the reasons of migrants who arrived in Sweden in 2020. For this purpose instead of using the label [migr\_resvalid] we have used the label [migra\_resfirst].




Source: EUROSTAT [migr\_resfirst]

The data show that for Afghanistan, Morocco and Iran, the first reason for migration is family reunification, followed by 'other reasons' for Afghanistan and Iran (we assume they relate to applying for refugee status). As for Morocco, on the other hand, immediately after family reunification we find employment reasons (although there were only 516 Moroccan migrants in 2020). Finally, as far as Ukraine is concerned we find a difference: the first reason for migration is employment reasons followed by family reunification reasons.

#### 4. Population growth


The population in Sweden within the last decade has a growth of 0,9%. On the 1st January 2013, the total population was 9.555.893, while in 2022 it was 10.452.326.



Source: EUROSTAT [DEMO\_PJAN\_\_custom\_5693164]

## 5. Flows of migrants in the last 10 years


The following graphs illustrate the flows of migrants from 2012 to 2021 (last data available) focusing firstly on the two phenomena of immigration and emigration and secondly creating a comparison between the two trends in order to understand their actual size.



Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_IMM8\_\_custom\_5710018]


The immigration flow chart depicts an increasing number of immigrants from 2012 to 2016, where the highest peak is reached (163.005), it probably reflects the great number of arrivals through the Mediterranean Sea in those years. By contrast, there is a significant decline from 2016 to 2020 where the number of immigrants has fallen to 82.518 and only in 2020 it slightly rises, we can suppose that this drop is a direct result of the Italy-Libya Agreement.





Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_EMI2\_\_custom\_5710012]

Turning next to emigration, the line chart shows that the number of emigrants remains mainly between 45,000 and 52,00 and it reaches a peak in 2015 of 55.830.



Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_IMM8\_\_custom\_5710018] [MIGR\_EMI2\_\_custom\_5710012]

Finally moving to the graph that compares the two flows, what stands out is that the number of immigrants always almost doubles the one of emigrants, becoming the triple in 2015 and 2016. Moreover, the chart shows that the two flows have different tendencies, the immigration varies a lot within the ten years, on the contrary, the emigration remains mostly stable.


## **6. Flows of migrants in the last 10 years by category (sex, age, country of birth, reason for migration)**

This section of the report will analyse the flows of migrants in the last 10 years by considering sex, age, country of birth and reason for migration. In particular, it will analyse the flows of Morocco, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq. Unfortunately, Eurostat does not show all statistics for each year, so some analysis will consider 8 or 9 years.


### **6.1 Reasons to migrate**

A very important way to analyse the immigration flow to Sweden from 2012 to 2021 is by considering the reasons to migrate. This graph shows four reasons to migrate: family reasons, which means in particular family reunions, education reasons, employment reasons and other reasons, which means particularly the asylum requests.

The employment reasons (grey curve) and the education reasons (orange curve) are more constant because they are dictated by the Sweden migration politics. The other reasons (yellow curve) are more variable, because they depend on worldwide events, in particular in nearby areas such as the Middle East.




Source: EUROSTAT [TPS00170\_custom\_5782970]




Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_RESFAS\_custom\_5781063]

Moving on to consider specific countries of origin, we firstly observe the immigration flow from Afghanistan, which is characterised by a prevalence of the yellow line (other reasons, asylum requests) that reach their peak in 2017, due to the crises that have taken place in the Middle East during, precisely including the refugee crisis. This line decreases after 2017, the year after the signing of the Eu-Turkey deal.




Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_RESFAS\_\_custom\_5780998]

Regarding the Moroccan immigration flow to Sweden, the graph shows a clear prevalence of the blue line (family reasons), which is much more predominant than the other reasons: this indicates that Sweden is a country of family reunifications for Morocco, so it can be affirmed that it deals with the second-generation migration.




Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_RESFAS\_\_custom\_5781150]

The chart above shows the immigration flow from Iraq. This graph is characterised by the decrease of the blue line (family reasons), from which can deduce that, as the Moroccan case, Sweden was and still is a country of family reunification for the Iraqi people after the Iraq war of 2003. Like Afghanistan, the yellow line increases and reaches its peak in 2017, then it begins its decrease after the EU-Turkey deal.



Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_RESFAS\_\_custom\_5781105]

This graph keeps into consideration the case of the Iranian immigration flow from 2010 to 2021. This case is a very peculiar case, because of trends: the education reasons line (orange line) declined sharply in 2010 due to the outbreak of the Arab Springs throughout the Middle East. As with Afghan and Iraq cases, the yellow line increases from 2015 to 2017, due to the refugees' crisis, and then decreases after that year, due to the EU-Turkey deal of 2016. But what is most surprising is the family reasons trend: as a matter of fact, despite various fluctuations, it always reaches a high number of immigrants. It can be deduced that lots of Iranian people left the country in the years before 2010, due to the instability of the area.




Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_RESFAS\_\_custom\_5780908]

Further on, this graph shows the migration trend in Sweden with regard to Ukrainian migrants and the reasons why they migrate. As we can see “employment reasons” and “family reasons” remain the main drivers for Ukrainian migrants migrating to Sweden.

## 6.2 Migration flows by country of birth

We now focus on migration flows from 2012 to 2020 **by country of birth**.




Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_IMM3CTB\_\_custom\_5779957]

As can be observed from the graph, the Middle East's countries of birth (Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran) are those that grow more than Ukraine and Morocco. This is related to crises in the Middle East, like the Syrian war in 2016, the ISIS expansion in the "Mashrek". As a matter of fact, the three curves increased constantly from 2015 to 2017. 2017 is a very important year, because it's the first year after the EU-Turkey deal signed in 2016 to cooperate in order to stop migration from the ME through the Balkan route. In fact, from that year, the curves are decreasing.

Another interesting point of view is the growth of the blue line, which represents the Ukrainian immigration flow. The growth is due to the beginning of war with Russia in 2014.

### 6.3 Immigration Flow by Age (Morocco, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Ukraine)


In this paragraph, states are grouped according to age groups and states considered are Morocco, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Ukraine.



Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_IMM3CTB\_\_custom\_5768418]

The first graph shows the immigration flow by age from Morocco: it can be seen that it is not a substantial migration, as the low numbers in the y-axis show. That's because it deals with second-generation migrants, in fact, the age of the immigrants is much higher than the others


taken into consideration: the grey line, the yellow line, the light blue line, and the green line are more visible.



Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_IMM3CTB\_\_custom\_5768885]


The second graph shows the immigration flow by age of the Afghan people from 2013 to 2020. The common element of all curves in this graph is two years 2016-2017, there is a constant growth. But, what emerges from this graph is the growth of the orange curve (Afghan immigrants aged from 15 to 19) from 2015, which reaches its peak in 2017. The other relevant information is the peak of the grey curve in 2019, which represents immigrants aged from 20 to 29.





Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_IMM3CTB\_\_custom\_5768620]


The graph above shows the immigration flow by age of the Iranian people from 2013 to 2020. What first emerges from this graph is the yellow line above the others, the yellow line represents immigrants aged from 30 to 39 years: in fact, the immigration flow of Iranian people to Sweden is older than , for example, the Iraqi or the Afghan one. Even though the orange and the blue lines reach their peak in 2017, the yellow one and the grey one continue to grow until 2019. This underlines the fact that the immigration flow from Iran to Sweden is much older than the Afghan one or the Iraqi one.



Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_IMM3CTB\_\_custom\_5780122]

This graph shows the immigration flow by age of the Ukrainian immigrants from 2013 to 2020.

The constant growth of all curves is due to the recent Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014, until the start of the pandemic in 2020. Even though this graph does not show 2021 and 2022, it is possible that the number of immigrants from Ukraine to Sweden are in constant growth.




Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_IMM3CTB\_\_custom\_5768199]

This graph shows the immigration flow by age of the Iraqi people from 2013 to 2020.

This graph is very simple to analyse, as a matter of fact we can see, as the afghan graph, a constant growth of all curves until 2017: the age ranges that are growing the most are from 20 to 29, from 30 to 39 and less than 15 years. The peak reached by the blue line is very significant, because this means that the immigration flow of Iraqi people in 2017 was a very young flow, rather than the other flows analysed.

## 6.4 Immigration Flow by sex


After having considered and analysed the various countries through the age variable, the



variable will be changed and gender will be taken into account.


Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_IMM3CTB\_\_custom\_5782900]

By considering sex, the graph shows a constant male and female trend from 2012 to 2021. Across the flow, there is a male prevalence, with a bigger gap between the two sex in 2016. In 2016 there was the highest point reached by immigration, with more than 90,000 immigrants. In fact, the trend increases from 2012, but by 2016 the migration tends to decrease. The trend starts again to increase after 2020.




Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_IMM3CTB\_\_custom\_5767967]

The graph showing Ukraine immigration flow is characterised by a constant prevalence of female immigrants: the flow is constantly increasing since 2014 and we can hypothesise that this increment is due to the Ukraine-Russia war. So, it can be related that immigration from Ukraine is predominantly female because men are forced to go to war.




Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_IMM3CTB\_\_custom\_5780257]

The graph showing immigration flow from Iraq is characterised by a male predominance, with a peak in 2017 (more than 4000 male and more than 3000 female immigrants). The peak of 2017 is due to the crises of Syrian civil war and the ISIS presence in the Iraqi state. The immigration flow tends to decrease after 2017, because of the EU-Turkey deal on the refugees' crisis, just previously explained.




Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_IMM3CTB\_\_custom\_5768620]



Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_IMM3CTB\_\_custom\_5768885]

By considering the sex, the immigration flow from Afghanistan and from Iran from 2012 to 2020 are both characterised by a constant male prevalence, with relevant peaks in 2017 (almost 7000 male immigrants from Afghanistan and more 2500 male immigrants from Iran), 2018 and 2019. Graphs show also an increase in 2016 and 2017 and a decrease after that year, following the EU-Turkey deal.




Source: EUROSTAT [MIGR\_IMM3CTB\_\_custom\_5767639]

By considering the sex of immigrants, Moroccan immigration flow presents an alternation of men and women from 2012 to 2020, with a very low number of immigrants.

## 7. Refugees and asylum seekers

In this section, we will look more closely at the categories of refugees in Sweden, dividing them according to three elements : the asylum seeker, the sex ratio and the different groups of age.

In the following graph we show the total number of refugees in Sweden and the annual trend in the last ten years (2013-2021).




Data Source: World Bank

We can see that since 2013 there has been a constant increase in the number of refugees with the most significant change in 2016, when Sweden registered 230.158 refugees instead of the 159.516 of the previous year, with the highest annual change at 35,77%. Since 2019, instead, the total number of refugees started decreasing, showing a negative annual change.

Unfortunately we don't have data for the last two years (2022-2023).


## 7.1 Asylum seekers over the last ten years



Source: Eurostat [MIGR\_ASYAPPCTZA]

As reported by the Eurostat graph, in 2015 there has been a peak of asylum seekers. Although the term of asylum seekers is often used interchangeably with that of refugees, the latter identifies a narrower category, which is that of asylum seekers who have had their refugee status successfully recognized by the host country.


## 7.2 Asylum seekers by sex and group of age



Source: Eurostat [MIGR\_ASYAPPCTZA]



By considering the sex ratio of asylum seekers, from the following chart we can see that in 2021 the number of female asylum seekers in Sweden is a bit smaller than the number of their male counterparts.



Source: Eurostat [MIGR\_ASYAPPCTZA]

In the graph, we can observe the distribution of asylum seekers under four age groups and the total number of them, during the year 2022. Looking at it, it stands out that the majority of asylum seekers belong to the age group "From 18 to 34 years". This age group is immediately followed by "from 35 to 64", which clearly suggests that the majority of immigrants concerning asylum seekers, is composed of what we consider as the "second generation" of migrants, referring to mothers and fathers of the new young generation (category "less than 18 years"). In contrast, the graph suggests that older people represent an almost insignificant portion of asylum seekers.

### 7.3 Share of refugees on total migration

In order to find the share of refugees on total migration at 2022, we should take in consideration the total number of migrants in Sweden in 2022 : **90.631** and the total number of asylum seekers : **18.605**.

**THE SHARE OF REFUGEES ON TOTAL MIGRATION IN 2022 IN SWEDEN IS :**

**20,52%**

### 8. Migrants integration indicators employment or unemployment

Integration, assimilation, or incorporation referring to the adaptation of migrants in their destination countries, end up with the same meaning. It can be concluded from the work of Alba and Nee (2003)<sup>2</sup>, the above-mentioned terminologies would mean the reduction of the differences between immigrants and natives.

As migrants unconsciously try to secure themselves a comfortable life in the country of destination, assimilation/integration occurs. This is an indication of how a migrant fits in the foreign way of living.

There are many factors to be considered while studying such a phenomenon. Inter alia, the time of stay, activity rate, employment and wage received.


Our research report will be based on both employment and unemployment, evaluating controls such as age, sex, wage, period of stay, and citizenship in Sweden.

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<sup>2</sup> Alba, Richard D., and Victor Nee. 2003. *Remaking the American mainstream: Assimilation and contemporary immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.

In this synthesis, Alba and Nee reconceptualize assimilation as a form of ethnic change, focusing on three boundary processes—boundary crossing, boundary blurring, and boundary shifting. They argue that assimilation is the unintended consequence of strategies and actions that immigrants and their children often adopt in pursuit of familiar goals.

## 8.1 Activity rates by sex, age and citizenship (%)




Source: Eurostat [LFSA\_ARGAN\_\_custom\_5797990]

Though the activity rate of native females is higher than that of the foreign female, it is not as high as that of the native and foreign male.

The gap between the active rate of the foreign male and female is much larger compared to that between the native male and female. However, the activity rate of the natives is stable compared to that of the foreigners which is on a rise.

## 8.2 Employment (1000 - unit of measure)

The graph below compares the number of **employed natives to foreigners in Sweden**.




Eurostat [LFSA\_PGANWS\_\_custom\_5798097]Source

There is a larger difference between the employed native male and female than there is between the migrant male and female. Though the gap is widening with time, the gap between the employed native male and female is still wider.

### 8.3 Unemployment rate

The graph below compares the **unemployment rate of Swedish citizens to the non-citizens** by sex in the years 2012-2021

#### Unemployment rates by sex, age, and citizenship (%)



Source: Eurostat [LFSA\_URGAN\_custom\_5795158]


The unemployment rate of the natives is low and slightly varying. The trend slowly started to rise during the covid-19 pandemic period.

Meanwhile, the unemployment rate of the foreign female is on a rise as from 2016 and shooted during the covid-19 pandemic period.

At the same time, the unemployment rate of the foreign male is on a decline even during the covid-19 pandemic period. This can be because usually foreigners work mostly in the health-care and the delivery markets with a high supply in this period.

## 8.4 Mean income by group of citizenship

### Mean income by group of citizenship (population aged 18-64)



Source: Eurostat [ILC\_DI15\_\_custom\_5796672]

Swedish workers have a stable annual wage through a period of 8 years of about 30.000 euros p.a.

Foreigners in Sweden have an oscillating wage that rises and reduces in time, maintaining a peak of 25.000 euros. As years pass by, migrants are expected to earn more due to the experience obtained. Since the trend is not on a continuous rise, there are other factors affecting the mean wage other than education and experience obtained.

In conclusion a Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality was introduced in 2007 where the main goal of its strategy was to support the demand for labour and supply and equality in schools. In 2018 a single market policy programme was introduced whereby education and job training programmes became compulsory for the newcomers with new legislative changes. As a result, daily compensation cannot be paid if the immigrants do not pursue their education and job training. The above-mentioned legislative reforms were a response to the current Swedish government's plan (Government Offices of Sweden, 2019) for integrating newcomers that was introduced during the electoral period between 2014 and 2018 with the following main headings:

- Same requirements for newcomers as for other job seekers or unemployed persons
- Education and training are obligatory for newcomers
- Enhanced work training as a measure within the introduction programme
- Increased resources for civic information within early measures
- Increase in funding for promoting the fast-track programmes<sup>3</sup>

The effort of the Swedish government to include and integrate foreigners, is somehow working for the foreign male who are seen to improve in the labour market, though the gap between them and their female counterparts is wide. This may be due to the role of women in the family life who provide a stable life to foreign male to work better and more.

The difference of the wage earned by migrants and natives is also in a reducing trend and can be an indication that the policy on education and training is improving the foreigners' lives and job skills.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference of the conclusion  
[Integration Policies, Practices and Experiences – Sweden Country Report \(diva-portal.org\)](https://diva-portal.org/)