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The Economics of Migration

Demography and Migration

Professor AlessandraVenturini

a.a. 2020-21

Lesson 3

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Drivers of Migration

Economic drivers

Demographic drivers

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The effect on the population




Native-Born
Foreign-Born
Persons with national background (native-born parents)
Ever-international migrants
Foreigners
Persons with foreign background (foreign-born parents)
Descendants of foreign born (II generation)
Source: Bisogno 2008

What do you want to measure?

Which question are you trying to answer?

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	Births 2001**	Deaths 2001**	NATURAL CHANGE		Immigrants 2001**	Emigrants 2001**	NET MIGRATION
ITALIA	544,550	544,094	456		1,582,707	1,417,184	165,523

$$P_{31.12.2001} = P_{1.1.2001} + \mathbf{NC}_{2001} + \mathbf{NM}_{2001}$$

$$P_{31.12.2001} = 57.844.017 + \mathbf{456} + 165.523$$

$$P_{31.12.2001} = 58.009.996$$

But net migration is not appropriate if you want to understand the outflows from a country of origin,

The migration pressure

Gross migration

Migration rates for total populations are usually defined as the **number of events** divided by the **mid-period population**

$$\text{Rate of inward migration} = \frac{\text{arrivals}}{\text{mid-period population}} \times 1000$$

$$\text{Rate of outward migration} = \frac{\text{departures}}{\text{mid-period population}} \times 1000$$

$$\text{Rate of net migration} = \frac{\text{arrivals} - \text{departures}}{\text{mid-period population}} \times 1000$$

$$\text{Rate of gross migration} = \frac{\text{arrivals} + \text{departures}}{\text{mid-period population}} \times 1000$$

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An example of estimating net migration (from vital statistics)

Region	Births 1995–2000	Deaths 1995–2000	Natural Increase 1995–2000 (B – C)	Total Population Change 1995–2000	Net Migration 1995–2000 (E – D)
A	B	C	D	E	F
North	252 344	126 941	125 403	265 621	140 218
South	9 440	8 317	1 123	26 211	25 088
East	37 750	19 510	18 240	26 820	8 580
West	23 059	8 682	14 377	27 520	13 143
Total	322 593	163 450	159 143	346 172	187 029


Total aged
25–29 in
1995
Survivors
aged 30–34
in 2000
Total aged
30–34 in
2000
Net
migration,
ages 30–34
(C–B)
A
B
C
D

TAB. 1.7. *Saldi migratori medi annui nelle principali aree geografiche e in alcuni paesi europei, 1950-2000 (valori assoluti in migliaia)*

Aree geografiche	1950-60	1960-70	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000
Europa settentrionale[a]	–103	–12	6	19	157
Regno Unito	–54	–2	–18	10	96
Svezia	8	21	10	16	21
Europa occidentale	207	430	230	312	550
Francia	96	198	66	53	64
Germania	99	170	122	184	383
Europa orientale[b]	–315	–170	2	134	99
Russia	–133	–134	32	208	416
Ucraina	–36	59	25	22	–11
Europa meridionale[c]	–268	–315	63	10	330
Italia	–101	–83	–3	–14	118
Spagna	–78	–60	15	19	118
Europa[d]	–480	–64	304	479	1.139

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

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$$\text{Net } M'_{x+n} = P^n_{x+n} - S \times P^0_x$$

where

Net M'_{x+n} is the estimated net migration for the end-of-period population aged x - n, obtained by forward survival

n is the interval in years between the two dates

P^0_x is the initial population aged x

P^n_{x+n} is the end-of-period population aged $x + n$

S is the survival ratio from age x to age $x + n$.

The numbers in a cohort at the start are multiplied by their survival ratio, then the resulting estimate of survivors is subtracted from the cohort's numbers at the end of the period

The outcome is the net migration estimate

73


(a) Net Migration Gain
Net migration gain
Cohort size ages 60–64
Expected initial population
Cohort size ages 65–69
5 years


(b) Net Migration Loss
Net migration loss
Cohort size ages 60–64
Expected initial population
Cohort size ages 65–69
5 years

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Remember the limitation of the data that you use.

Figura 1 – Stranieri e immigrati residenti. Censimento 2001



Census in 11 languages

54

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Demographic Driver of migration in the DESTINATION COUNTRIES

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Replacement migration is a solution for declining population?

- Replacement migration refers to the international migration that would be needed to offset declines in the **size** of a population,

  declines in the population of **working age**

  as well as to offset **the overall ageing** of a population

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Europe's demographic situation

- Demographic projections show that Europe's population is **diminishing in size** as well as **becoming older.**
  - While on average around 2.1 children per woman of childbearing age are required to replace the population, the EU average is 1.53.
  - Life expectancy is increasing.
  - The proportion of those aged 65 and over is projected to rise to 22% by 2025.
  - Within this, the relative number of people of 80 and older is rising faster still.
  - This means that a growing number of people above retirement age will need to be supported by those in employment.
  - On present trends, the EU working age population will fall by approximately 40 million people from 2000 until 2050 and the old age dependency ratio will double from 24% to 49%.

Europe's demographic situation

- **Regional differences** are significant for all the measures examined
  - whereas a number of regions including the south of France and Greece will not face population decline for decades, population is already declining in some regions of Spain, of Italy, of Germany and of the Nordic countries,
  - With regard to the old-age dependency ratio - the number aged 65 and over relative to those of working-age (15 to 64) - the most marked increases are expected to take place in Italy, Sweden, Finland and Germany and the smallest in Ireland, Portugal and Luxembourg.

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Fig.1: Old age dependency ratio 1952-2050



Source: Philippe Fargues, 2011, Author's calculation based on UN Population Data Online

Public Health Care Expenditure by Age Groups*



* Expenditure per capita in each age group divided GDP per capita.
Source: ENPRI-AGIR, national authorities and Secretariat calculations.

Migration

- Migration is the most volatile of the components determining population size and structure
  - While fertility and mortality rates change gradually, the number of people entering or leaving a country can vary significantly from one year to the next.
  - The past 10 years have witnessed great fluctuations in European migration levels, as well as significant regional variations.
  - Future migration trends largely turn on policy decisions about migration needs in Europe. However, the 'supply' side in the form of continuing migration pressure from outside the EU is also a much-discussed aspect.
  - Researchers have added a demographic perspective to this theme by pointing out that the 'stagnating entity' Europe is 'surrounded by populations with run-away growth'.
  - Projections suggest that while in the post-world war II era, the population of **Spain was three times larger than Morocco's**; in about **2050 Morocco's population might be 50 per cent larger than Spain's**. A similar picture emerges when comparing France and Algeria or Germany and Turkey.

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ESA/P/WP.160
21 March 2000

ENGLISH ONLY

Population Division
Department of Economic and Social Affairs
United Nations Secretariat

Replacement Migration:
Is it A Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?

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Figure I.1. Per cent change in total population for selected countries and regions, 2000-2050



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

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POPULATION OF THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 1995 AND 2050, SCENARIO I

Member countries as of 2000	*Population (thousands)*		*Projected change 1995-2050*	
	1995	*2050 (Scenario I)*	*(thousands)*	*(per cent)*
Austria	8 001	7 094	- 907	- 11.3
Belgium	10 088	8 918	- 1 170	- 11.6
Denmark	5 225	4 793	- 567	- 10.9
Finland	5 108	4 898	- 210	- 4.1
France	58 020	59 883	1 863	+ 3.2
Germany	81 661	73 303	- 8 358	- 10.2
Greece	10 489	8 233	- 2 256	- 21.5
Ireland	3 609	4 710	1 101	+ 30.5
Italy	57 338	41 197	- 16 141	- 28.2
Luxembourg	407	430	23	+ 5.7
Netherlands	15 459	14 156	- 1 303	- 8.4
Portugal	9 856	8 137	- 1 719	- 17.4
Spain	39 568	30 226	9 342	- 23.6
Sweden	8 800	8 661	- 139	- 1.6
United Kingdom	58 308	56 667	- 1 641	- 2.8
European Union	371 937	331 307	- 40 630	- 10.9

Population of the European Union (15) in 2050, indicating those who are post-1995 migrants and their descendants, by scenario



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Population of Italy in 2050, indicating those who are post-1995 migrants and their descendants, by scenario



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Age-sex structures by scenario - Europe 15



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Age-sex structures by scenario - Italy



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Age-sex structures by scenario- Europe 15

Constant age group 15-64	Constant ratio 15-64/65 years or older





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Age-sex structures by scenario - Italy

Constant age group 15-64	Constant ratio 15-64/65 years or older



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UN Report

- This comprehensive analysis, the first to be made on a common methodology on a fully international basis has attracted unusual attention and provoked much comment in the media.
- Because of this systematic approach, and because of the prestige attaching to the UN Population Division, the report has been widely read and cited.
- Its statistics will be a definitive benchmark for years to come.

A) Critics of too much 'optimism' on immigration as solution

B) Critics of having underestimated other positive consequences of immigration

C) Migration replacement is already here!

Against..

- the almost universal *impression* conveyed to the public is that the UN has stated the following:
  - (a) that population, workforce numbers and support ratios must be kept at their present levels and therefore
  - (b) that the projected levels of immigration must be encouraged by the countries concerned.

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✓The idea is that *"This interpretation of the report has provoked comprehensive public misinformation"*

Demographers critique

- Alternatives (pensions, retirement and workforce reform, productivity, more substantial changes in fertility) were noted but not evaluated

The political, social and economic costs of large-scale immigration received no mention.

The Report's concentration on the demographic abstraction of the 'potential support ratio' without considering equally or more important non demographic components of real dependency levels in real societies, has been criticised as 'demographism' (Tarmann 2000).

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(A) Coleman's conclusions on UK example

- The answers to the two questions posed in the UN Report can immigration solve problems of :
  1. population decline
  2. population ageing

They are respectively:

1. "yes, if you really think you want to"
2. "no, except at rates of immigration so high that they would generate economically and environmentally unsustainable population growth rates and permanently and radically change the cultural and ethnic composition of the host population: 'replacement migration', indeed"

[Incidentally about 1) Reconstructions of the population effects of past immigration]

- Reconstruction of French population history over the last century (to 1986)
  - showed that the direct and indirect effects of immigration over that time had added 10.2 million people to the French population, of whom 3.9 million were immigrants born outside France
  - Without it, France would have lacked one in five of its births and its 1986 population would have been 45.1 million instead of 55.3
  - In particular, immigration accounted for about 40 % of population increase since the Second World War.
- Substantial growth in the UK population between 1951 and 1995
  - as a result of the direct and indirect effects of migration – by 2.89 million according to the 'modified fertility' scenario
  - Migration accounted for 30 percent of total population growth over the period

At EU level consensus on:

- Well-managed migration inflows could provide a positive contribution to employment and economic growth if we manage to successfully promote the integration of immigrants in our societies.
- ✓However, **even doubling present levels of immigration flows could not offset the implications of ageing in the labour market and pensions.**
- ✓Pension systems are not very sensitive to immigration increases. Simulations confirm that even doubling or tripling the levels of annual immigration flows provided by the baseline demographic scenario for the next 40 years could not compensate for the growth of the economic dependency ratio.
- ✓We will still need to focus our efforts on employment policies and pensions reforms, if we are to achieve sustainable labour markets and pensions systems.
- ✓*"immigration can contribute to filling certain specific gaps on the European labour market, but it can in no way stop or reverse the process of significant population ageing in Europe" 2002 Social Situation report*

- **The hesitancy of policy makers with regard to immigration** as an answer to demographic challenges is connected to three main aspects:

- The composition of the immigrant flows involved

To maximise the positive effects of immigration for pension and health care systems, the desired immigrants would be as young as possible

- The social sustainability of large scale **immigration**

- The durability of immigration's effect on ageing

On this view, replacement migration is not a long-term solution to population ageing, because migrants also age. While increased immigration would certainly have an **immediate impact** on the working-age population, the long-term effects are less certain

Large consensus

- Forecasting international migration is a very difficult task, due to the high level of uncertainty associated with this phenomenon.

The results of the forecasts are in many cases uncertain, as migration is highly sensitive to two unpredictablefactors:

- migration policies
- political developments,

Usually: quantification of the knowledge-based scenarios,applying a methodology widely used in demographic forecasting, in order to accommodate the possible impact of economic factors and migration policies.

- not consideration the consequences of possible future political disruptions

Forecast of Letizia Mencarini



Fonte: Previsioni dell'autore su dati Istat (2003) e Caritas (2003).

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Italian population 65+ /20-64 years old in the next 70 years



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Demographic driver of migration in the origin countries

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Demographic transition model



a = beginning of the transition
b = greatest difference between birth and death rates
c = end of the transition

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DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION MODEL



DTM shows **population change over time**,
how birth rate and death rate affect the total population of a country

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Beginning, end, duration, and "multiplier" of the demographic transition

Country	Beginning and end of the transition	Duration in years	Multiplier
Sweden	1810–1960	150	3.83
Germany	1876–1965	90	2.11
Italy	1876–1965	90	2.26
USSR	1896–1965	70	2.05
France	1785–1970	185	1.62
China	1930–2000	70	2.46
Taiwan	1920–1990	70	4.35
Mexico	1920–2000	80	7.02

Source: J.-C. Chesnais, *La transition démographique* (PUF, Paris, 1986), pp. 294, 301.

Figure 2.1
Total Population Sizes, and China and India, 2000–2035



SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010.

RAND MG1009-2.1

Figure 2.3
Total Fertility Rates, China and India, 2000–2035



SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010.

RAND MG1009-2.3

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The massive European emigration

- At the end of 18th century more than 8 million people of Europe extraction about equally divided inhabited the 2 halves of the American continent
- Over 3 centuries Europe had by means of Iberian and British imperialism established the political, economic, and demographic foundations for coming mass migration

Causes of migration:

- Economic:
  - The Industrial revolution and technological progress increased the productivity and so rendered masses of workers superfluous, especially in rural areas
- Demographic
  - The transition entailed a *large demographic "multiplier"* speeding up population growth and worsening the problems created by economic change

The **availability of land and space** in North and South America (and Oceania) combined with **labour demand** created conditions for massive migration

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Estimates for European transoceanic migration between 1846-1932

From the major countries of Departure:

- 18 million UK/Ireland
- 11.1 Italy
- 6.5 Spain/Portugal
- 5.2 Austria/Hungary
- 5 Germany
- 3 Poland/Russia
- 2 Sweden/Norway

Destinations:

- 34.2 million US
  - (US restrictive laws 1921-4)
- 7.1 Argentina/Uruguay
- 5.2 Canada
- 4.4 Brazil
- 3.5 Australia/New Zeland
- 1 Cuba

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In the first 15 years of 1900 **annual rate of European emigration = >3 per thousand**

= 1/3 pop growth

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"Old" and "new" migration to United States



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Importance of emigration for European demographic system

Italian example:

- Between 1861-1961,
  8 million of net Italian population loss due to emigration
  - If that emigrants had remained in Italy and had grown at the same rate as that of the Italian population
- It would in 1981 have numbered 14 million
  = about 25 percent of the national population at that time

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Emigration and natural growth for continental Europe



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Increase of agricultural employment (1870-1910) and emigration (1900-10)



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Hypotheses about migration and the demographic

Friedlander (1969)

- Examined the interrelationships between migration, fertility and population growth

- HP: timing of fertility decline depended on whether there were opportunities for internal/external migration

  = The amount of growth from natural increase occurring in European countries during the transition is related to opportunities for migration

Zelinsky (1971)

- There are patterned changes through time in rats of different type of popualtion movement

- HP: These changes are paralleling the stages of the demographic transition (no causal links)
  - Mobility transition: migration and mobility are mechanism and symptoms of changes taking place in societies

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Direction of world migration 1945-73

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Direction of world migration post 1973



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Hints for a Bibliography

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Friedlander D. (1969) Demographic response and population change, *Demography, 6, 359-381.*

Zelinski W. (1971) The hypothesis of the mobility transition, *Geographical Review, 219-249.*

Zelinski W. (1979) The demographic transition:changing patterns of migration, in La science de la population au service de l'homme, IUESP, Liege.

Livi Bacci M (2000) A concise history of world population, 3rd ed, Blackwell. (Chapter 4)

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The Relationship between Economic Development and Population Growth Rate for Developing Nations



Figure 7.14
Environmental Science

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

Urban and rural population growth

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Total urban population



Total rural population



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Source: WUP 2014, authors' calculations

Africa's population growth: 2015 to 2050

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Between 2015 and 2050, population in

- West Africa will grow by 133% (465 million)
- East Africa will grow by 120% (475 million°



Source: World Population Prospects, 2012 Medium Fertility Scenario
Cirad Cartography Unit

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From 6 billion to 7 billion people

Contribution per continent to Earth's 7th billion people. Length of person shows absolute population growth per respective continent - and indicates contributing share. Percentages to 7th billion are as follows: Asia 57%, Africa 28%, Latin America 9%, North America 4%, Europe 1%, Oceania 1%.



Data: UN World Population Prospects 2010 Rev. | Infographic: Bitsofscience.org

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Trends in the Total Fertility Rate, UN Projections



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Factors influencing Population growth



www.economicshelp.org

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Women with more than secondary education tend to have fertility rates that are closer to replacement levels



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
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1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
IIASA Medium Scenarium
Post Secondary
Upper Secondary
Lower Secondary
Primary
Incomp. Primary
No Education
Pop < 15 yrs

Some consequences of rapid population growth

An analytic diagram designed by Gerhard K. Heilig, 2013.





Figure 0 1 Population age structure diagrams for countries with rapid, slow, zero, and negative population growth rates. (Data from Population Reference Bureau)

FIGURE 7.1: Projected population size in sub-Saharan regions (Source: own calculations)



FIGURE 6. MIGRATION ON BALANCE – AFRICA'S MAIN COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION

Stock of immigrants and emigrants for selected African countries, 2017.



Note: 'immigrant' refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the listed country. 'Emigrant' refers to people born in the listed country currently residing outside their country of birth. Showing the top 15 African countries of destination and origin.

Source: UN Population Division, International Organisation for Migration; visualisation: Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (KCMD).

FIGURE 7. FORCED MIGRATION ON BALANCE IN AFRICA'S MAIN REFUGEE-PRODUCING AND REFUGEE-RECEIVING COUNTRIES

Stock of refugees, stock of IDPs, 2016, absolute numbers, in millions.



Note: the figure shows the top African countries based on the stock of international refugees and internally displaced persons.

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Displacement Monitoring Centre, International Organisation for Migration; visualisation: Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (KCMD).