



Migration in Europe

Professor Alessandra Venturini

Lesson 9 – The effect of immigration in the destination labour market




UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI TORINO



Jean Monnet Chair European Migration Studies Co-funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union



What do EU citizens consider an important issue for their countries?



Source: Eurobarometer







Migration always has been an hot topic and migration policy is always under revision

One of the key argument used in the debate is the positive or negative role played by foreigners in the labour market of destination country

and according to their effect migration policy and related policies are changed.

Video <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R2trsZfP1QU</u>



Jean Monnet Chair European Migration Studies Co-funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union



EU migrants in the UK: a snapshot

- Video link, from May 16, 2016
- Imagine you are a UK-born resident of Boston. How would you vote during the Brexit referendum?
- Boston with 75.6% 'Leave' vote had the highest Brexit vote in Britain








Video re-cap

- What is the share of immigrants living in Boston? Is it big?
- Who are the immigrants (origin, education)? Why did they come? How long do they stay in the UK?
- What are the effects on wages and unemployment in Boston?
- Which other immigration effects were mentioned?
 - Demography
 - Prices
 - Entrepreneurship
 - Education
 - Security
 - Identity





Is immigration to blame for Brexit?




Source: The Guardian




Jean Monnet Chair European Migration Studies Co-funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union



Is immigration to blame for Brexit?











The debate on this theme is characterized by conflicting

and emotional stances.

- Supporters of competition argue as if there were a given number of jobs in an economy and they assume that the foreigners cannot set off any growth in demand.
- The supporters of complementarity, instead, assume that there is a clear segmentation between foreigners and natives, thus no

competition can arise.

- The impact of immigration can also be affected by changes in the business cycle; by periods of excess demand or excess supply and the contrasting effects of reduced wage growth but also of reduced inflation, which could be beneficial to the natives, too.
- The passionate discussion about hypothetical reactions of the labour market can go on for ever but economic theory is unequivocal on this point.







Types of Migration

- •a-labour migration, family reunion, political refugee
 •b-temporary versus permanent migration
 duration of the temporary migration, contracted
 migration
- c-skilled versus unskilled
- selection of the supply, selection of the demand and policy selectivity







1.The effect f immigration at the aggregate economic level

• Political issue

This is the main political issue but the answer to this question need to know the effect of immigration in all the following area and even more.

Policies to implement

Selective immigration policies and specific policies to contrast the negative effects of immigration



Jean Monnet Chair European Migration Studies





This is the field where **less empirical research** has been conducted. There is a large body of empirical evidence that immigration increases the aggregate GNP in destination country; but this is not enough to draw a positive conclusion.

The idea that **foreign labour can act as an engine for economic growth** is based on studies carried out in the 1950s and 1960s. Lewis, Kindelberger, Lutz were there was a positive link between **population and growth** and the rate of accumulation and technological progress.

The case of Switzerland, a country that has always exercised strict control over immigration, reveals that the output elasticity of labour is lower for foreigners (0.10) than for natives (0.46) (Butare, Favarger 1995), which means that foreigners have a positive impact on the growth of income but not on per-capita income.








 Migrants provide flexibility in very rigid labour markets

The conclusions reached in the literature (Dolado, Ichino, Goria 1994) agree in identifying a positive effect for the growth of per-capita income in the receiving country, if the foreigner's human capital is higher than that of the native, and vice versa if it is lower.







Income distribution negative effects.







2- The effect of immigrants on the destination labour market

Political issues:

Immigrants should not damage native workers by reducing their wages or/and replacing natives in their jobs. This result will create conflict, increasing the burden of unemployment on the welfare state, and it is not economically and socially feasible

Policies to implement:

The migration policy should be selective in order to reduce labour market competition which damages native workers and passive labour market policies i.e. unemployment benefits should alleviate the negative employment effect, and active labour market policies should retrain native workers for future job offers.







The policy issue is frequently unclear.

- It is not clear if the policy issue is the average native wage (and employment) or only the wage of a single bcategory of workers, say blue collars.
- It is somewhat vague because it hides a distributive problem difficult to solve for policy makers.









The economic theory is very clear

Immigrant workers are defined as being competitive or substitutes when they have a negative effect on wages and/or native employment levels, and they are defined as complementary when the effect is positive.









Competition or Complementarity by Categories Competition between:

- A. regular immigrants and natives of equal skill level
- B. regular immigrants and natives of different skill level
- C. regular natives and irregular immigrants
- D. irregular natives and irregular immigrants
- E. internal mobility (USA, EU, South Europe)
- F. production decentralization








The political debate is imbued with ideas derived from the simplest model.

- But the effects of immigration depend upon the flexibility of the capital market,
- the size of the country small and therefore a price taker or big and therefore a price maker –
- the **flexibility of the equilibrium wage** in the labour market,
- the **available technology mix**, which conditions the options available to firms.





a-traditional approach










Domestic labour supply can be elastic or rigid, usually man have a more inelastic lavour supply while woman have a more elastic labour supply.

For a moment we immagine that the demand is given in a close labour market where nothing else change,

thus the effect of the inflow of immigrants will be only a wage reduction in the case of a rigid supply

or a wage reduction and a voluntary unemployment increase in the case of an elastic supply.



SAME SKILL IN THE MEDIUM RUN THE DEMAND CHANGE







The conclusion changes if there are two sectors and two types of labour and migrants are only unskilled. Reduction of unskilled wages and increase of skilled wages in the short run and average wage remain constant.

Wage reduction in the unskilled sector can attract capital and displace skilled labour.





Empirical tests use spatial correlation

The tests use individual earnings data explained by individual characteristics (Xi at time t) and many other variables at regional or sector level (Da at time t), among which the variable of interest is the share of foreign workers

 $\log W_{i,a,t} = a + b X_{i,a,t} + \gamma D_{a,t} + e$







But the model just refers to a close labour market i.e. Card 2001

Fixed effects

The allocation of immigrants is not independent of permanent conditions

in the various areas. Amenities may be more abundant?

Simultaneity

Imagine that migrants can choose where they settle. They will tend to move where wages are, ceteris paribus, higher.

Bartel 1989 instruments



Jean Monnet Chair European Migration Studies



.abour market effects: Mixed evidence of wage effects in he US)

	Country	Sample	Specification	Group	Coefficient	S.E.
Borjas (2003)	United States	Census and CPS, 1960–2001	OLS, weighted, decadal	natives, men	-0.57	(0,16
Borjas (2014)	United States	Census and ACS 1960-2011	OLS, weighted, decadal	natives, men	-0.53	(0.10
Card and Peri (2015)	United States	Census and ACS 1960-2011	OLS, weighted, decadal	natives, men	-0.12	(0.13)
Card (1990)	United States	Census and CPS, 1979-1985, 4 MSAs	OLS, 3-year difference	natives, white*	-0.14	-
Abonji and Card (1991)	United States	Census, 1970-1980, 120 MSAv	IV, weighted decadal	natives, low education natives, white dropouts	$-1.21 \\ -1.10$	(0.34 (0.64
Card (2007)	United States	Census, 1980-2000, 100 MSAs	IV, weighted, cross-section	sutives	0.06	(0.01
Boustan, Fishback, and Kantor (2010)	United States	Census, 1940, 69 MSAs	IV, weighted, cross-section	men	0.01	(0.54
Borjas (2015)	United States	Census and CPS, 1977–1992, 44 MSAs	OLS, weighted, 3-year difference	natives, droponts ^e	-2.63	(1.08
Peri and Yasenov (2016)	United States	Census and CPS, 1977-1992, 44 MSAs	OLS, weighted, 3-year difference	natives, dropouts ^d	0.56	(0.73)
LaLonde and Topel (1991)	United States	Census, 1970 and 1980, MSA \times arrival cobort	OLS, weighted, decadal	immigrants, recent (<5yrs.) arrivals	-0.09	(0.03
Card (2001)	United States	Census, 1999, MSA × occupation	IV, weighted, cross-section	natives, men	-0.10	(0.03)
Borjas (2006)	United States	Census, 1960–2000, MSA × education × experience	OLS, weighted, decadal	natives	-0.06	(0.02
Card and Lewis (2007)	United States	Census, 1980-2000, MSA × education	IV, weighted, decadal	natives, men	-0.04	(0.06
Card (2009)	United States	Census and ACS, 1980-2006, MSA × education	IV, weighted, decadal	natīves, men	-0.42	(0.28)
Lewis (2011)	United States	Census, 1980-2000, MSA × education	IV, weighted, decadal	natives, manufacturing	-0.14	(0.04

Source: Dustmann et al (2016)





b-skilled versus unskilled

selection of the supply, selection of the demand and policy selectivity

i.e. USA, UK, Australia, Germany, Italy etc.

Jean Monnet	Chair				Er	asmus+	Programm
European Migration			in % of total employment		Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union		
						13	
nationals							
armed forces	0.3	1.1	0.6	0.5	1.4	0.6	0.6
managers	7.7	10.4	6.5	7.9	6.1	12.6	14.9
professionals	9	18.5	12.2	10.6	12	14.5	14.7
technicians	13.8	10.2	16.8	17.4	19.7	18.2	8.3
clerks	15.2	17	12.7	14.9	13.8	13.3	16.6
service worker	11.9	10	13.6	14.1	12	10.7	15.6
farmer/agricultural worker	6.3	2.6	1.8	1.2	5.1	2.4	3.4
craft worker	18.9	13.4	12.6	13.3	18.3	10.8	12.7
assembler	8.7	8	8.2	10.5	7.1	7.3	8.5
basic occupation	8.1	8.8	7.3	8.5	6.8	9.5	11.5
non-nationals:EU							
armed forces	0	0.1	0.7	0.2	0.2	0	0
managers	15.8	15	11.9	5.4	9.2	11.3	18.8
professionals	23.8	11.4	20.1	6.4	8.8	16.5	21.4
technicians	21.4	10	20.6	6.3	11.4	16.1	6.8
clerks	9.1	11.2	11.6	5.5	8.1	12.8	11.9
service worker	11.5	9.8	15	17.6	9.3	13.4	8.7
farmer/agricultural worker	1.5	1	0.9	0.1	3.1	0.8	7.5
craft worker	8.3	20.2	6.6	29.4	19.6	12.6	8.3
assembler	6.1	10.7	10.3	15.1	12.3	9.2	5.8
basic occupation	2.5	10.7	5	8.9	19.1	16.6	2.7
non-nationals:non-EU							
armed forces	0	0.7	0.3	2.5	0.1	0	0
managers	2.4	12.4	9.4	7.4	3.3	7.1	16.8
professionals	3.2	7.6	17.4	5.7	5.1	7.6	19.6
technicians	5.5	3.5	11.2	5	8.1	7.9	6.9
clerks	3	6.8	5.4	5.8	5.4	7.3	10.2
service worker	8.4	12.7	14.8	17.9	13.3	12.2	7.2
farmer/agricultural worker	0.1	1.7	1.3	0.1	3.9	0.8	1.7
craft worker	28.8	16.2	11.1	20.8	26.5	14.7	8.5
assembler	18.1	(14.1)	11	19.4	15.7	18.3	7.8
basic occupation	30.6	24.3	20.8	9.8	18.6	22.8	25.6

Source: Kiehl/Werner (1999); based on Eurostat Labour Force Survey 1995.

Occupational status of foreign employees in selected EU countries, 1995

European







Share of Foreign born employment by schooling group, 2000





Figure 3



Distribution of US-born employed by schooling group, 2000







1-Selection by the Supply

Roy model: Wage dispersion in the destination country larger than wage dispersion in the origin one; thus the emigration is more rewarding for the skilled





2-Selection of the demand

The destination country is specialized in high skill products —has for instance fiscal incentive in upgrading the production - and need additional skilled labour.





3-Policy incentives

Quota for skilled labour And point system I.e. Australia, Canada, USA







Unemployment rates native-born and foreign-born (age 15– 64, 2009–2010)

	N	len	Women		
	Native	Foreign	Native	Foreign	
Denmark	7.7	15.1	6.9	12.1	
France	8.4	13.6	8.7	15.8	
Germany	7.0	12.6	6.0	10.7	
Italy	7.3	9.7	9.1	13.2	
Netherlands	3.8	8.5	3.8	7.7	
Spain	17.3	31.3	19.1	26.7	
UK	8.8	9.2	6.6	9.0	
US	10.9	10.0	8.7	9.5	





Job Displacement


Unemployment duration of natives Probability of transition from unemployment to employment of natives


Probability of transition from employment to unemployment of natives

Turnover rate
















Percentage foreign-born & unemployment rates










Unemployment rates foreign-born & native born







Skill Cell Approch

• We slice the countries in regional areas





THE MARIEL BOATLIFT

247

Characteristic	Whites	Blacks	Cubans	Hispanics	All
Characteristics of Population Age 16-61				11 - Table - Table -	A CANCERE IN C
1. Estimated Number (1000's)	319.3	244.1	252.4	102.9	928.4
2. Mean Education	12.8	11.4	11.0	11.6	11.8
3. Percent in Labor Force	75.6	68.3	77.2	68.8	73.1
Characteristics of Those in Labor Force					
4. Estimated Number (1000's)	241.3	166.6	194.7	70.8	678.2
5. Mean Education	13.1	11.8	11.3	11.9	12.1
6. Percent Age 16-24	21.1	24.1	22.0	26.0	22.8
Occupation Distribution (Percent of Employ	ed)				
7. Professional and Technical	19.1	10.9	9.5	1.01	13.2
8. Managers	15.7	2.8	8.6	8.1	9.4
9. Sales	6.2	4.4	7.8	7.6	6.5
10. Clerical	21.9	21.0	19.1	20.9	20.9
11. Craftsmen	13.3	9.4	15.1	12.7	12.8
12. Operatives	4.4	8.4	19.4	16.7	11.1
13. Transportation Operatives	2.6	8.1	5.4	5.9	5.2
14. Laborers	5.1	10.5	4.7	4.0	6.3
15. Farm Workers	1.1	0.1	0.4	0.8	0.6
16. Less-Skilled Service Workers	5.0	13.3	6.1	10.2	8.0
17. More-Skilled Service Workers	5.7	10.9	4.0	.9.0	6.2

Table 1. Characteristics of 16-61-Year-Olds in Miami, 1979.

Notes: White and black groups exclude hispanics. Hispanic group includes all hispanics other than Cubans. Less-skilled service workers include cleaning and food service workers. More-skilled service workers include health service, personal service, and protective service workers.

Source: Based on samples of employed workers in the outgoing rotation groups of the Current Population Survey in 1979.







Table 3. Logarithms of Real	Hourly Earnings of Workers Age 1	6-61 in Miami and Four
	Comparison Cities, 1979-85.	

	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·								
Group	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985		
Mozmi:									
Whites	1.85	1.83	1.85	1.82	1.82	1.82	1.82		
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.05)		
Blacks	1.59	1.55	1.61	1.48	1.48	1.57	1.60		
	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)		
Cubans	1.58	1.54	1.51	1.49	1.49	1.53	1.49		
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.04)		
Hispanics	1.52	1.54	1.54	1.53	1.48	1.59	1.54		
	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)	(.06)		
Comparison Cities:									
Whites	1.93	1.90	1.91	1.91	1.90	1.91	1.92		
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)		
Blacks	1.74	1.70	1.72	1.71	1.69	1.67	1.65		
	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)		
Hispanics	1.65	1.63	1.61	1.61	1.58	1.60	1.58		
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)		

Note: Entries represent means of log hourly earnings (deflated by the Consumer Price Index-1980=100) for workers age 16-61 in Miami and four comparison cities: Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, and Tampa-St. Petersburg. See note to Table 1 for definitions of groups.

Source: Based on samples of employed workers in the outgoing rotation groups of the Current Population Survey in 1979-85. Due to a change in SMSA coding procedures in 1985, the 1985 sample is based on individuals in outgoing rotation groups for January-June of 1985 only.





Table 4. Unemployment Rates of Individuals Age 16-61 in Miami and

Four Comparison Cities, 1979-85.

(Standard	Errors	in	Parent	heses)

Group	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Miami:		5.45m.5	10.015	0.50	APRIL 1	10.10	100 COL
Whites	3.1	2.5	3.9	5.2	6.7	3.6	4.9
	(1.1)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(1.1)	(0.9)	(1.4)
Blacks	8.3	5.6	9.6	16.0	18.4	14.2	7.8
	(1.7)	(1.3)	(1.8)	(2.3)	(2.5)	(2.3)	(2.3)
Cubaas	5.3	7.2	10.1	10.8	13.1	7.7	5.5
	(1.2)	(1.3)	(1.5)	(1.5)	(1.6)	(1.4)	(1.7)
Hispanics	6.5	7.7	11.8	9.1	7.5	12.1	3.7
	(2.3)	(2.2)	(8.0)	(2.5)	(2.1)	(2.4)	(1.9)
Comparison Cities:							
Whites	4.4	4.4	4.3	6.8	6.9	5.4	4.9
	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.4)
Blacks	10.3	12.6	12.6	12.7	18.4	12.1	13.3
	(0.8)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(0.9)	(1.3)
Hispanics	6.3	.8.7	8.3	12.1	11.8	9.8	9.3
	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.8)

Note: Entries represent means of unemployment indicator variable for individuals age 16-61 in Miami and four comparison cities: Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, and Tampa-St. Petersburg. Samples are based on individuals in the labor force. See notes to Table 3 for definitions of groups and data sources.





	Mea	n of Log Wage by Q	uartile of Predicted V	Wage	Difference of
Year	1st Quart.	2nd Quart.	3rd Quart,	4th Quart.	Means: 4th-1s
1979	1.31	1.61	1.71	2.15	.84
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.05)
1980	1.81	1.52	1.74	2.09	.77
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.05)
1981	1.40	1.57	1.79	2.06	.66
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.05)
1982	1.24	1.57	1.77	2.04	.80
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.05)
1983	1.27	1.53	1.76	2.11	.84
	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.05)	(.06)
1984	1.33	1.59	1.80	2.12	.79
	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
1985	1.27	1.57	1.81	2.14	.87
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.06)

Table 5. Means of Log Wages of Non-Cubans in Miami by Quartile

Note: Predicted wage is based on a linear prediction equation for the log wage fitted to individuals in four comparison cities; see text. The sample consists of non-Cubans (male and female, white, black, and Hispanic) between the ages of 16 and 61 with valid wage data in the carnings supplement of the Current Population Survey. Wages are deflated by the Consumer Price Index (1980 = 100).





Table 6. Comparison of Wages, Unemployment Rates, and Employment Rates for Blacks in Miami and Comparison Cities. (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

		All	Backs		Low-Education Blacks				
Difference in Log Wages,			Emp.	rrence in /Unemp., Comparison		rence in Wages,	Emp.	rence in /Unemp., Comparison	
	Miami –	Comparison	Emp		Miami –	Comparison	Emp		
Year	Actual	Adjusted	Pop. Rate	Unemp. Rate	Actual	Adjusted	Pop. Rate	Unemp. Rate	
1979	15	12	.00.	-2.0	13	15	.03	8	
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(1.9)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(3.8)	
1980	16	12	.05	-7.1	07	07	.03	-8.2	
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(1.6)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(3.5)	
1981	11	10	.02	- 3.0	05	11	.04	-7.7	
	(.05)	(.03)	(.03)	(2.0)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(4.2)	
1982	24	20	06	3.3	17	20	04	.6	
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(2.4)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(4.7)	
1983	21	15	02	.1	13	11	.04	-3.3	
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(2.7)	(.06)	(.05)	(.04)	(4.7)	
1984	10	05	04	2.1	04	03	.05	.1	
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(2.4)	(.06)	(.05)	(.04)	(4.7)	
1985	05	01	06	-5.5	.18	.09	.00	-4.7	
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(2.6)	(.07)	(.07)	(.06)	(5.6)	

Notes: Low-education blacks are those with less than 12 years of completed education. Adjusted differences in log wages between blacks in Miami and comparison cities are obtained from a linear regression model that includes education, potential experience, and other control variables; see text. Wages are deflated by the Consumer Price Index (1980=100). "Emp.-Pop. Rate" refers to the employment:population ratio. "Unemp. Rate" refers to the unemployment rate among those in the labor force.







Mariel Boatlift that didn't happen

- 1994: expectation of a new boatlift due to bad economical conditions
- Thousands left illegally US Navy redirected refugees to Guantanamo. Result: few migrants were able to migrate to Miami Non-event:

	Unemployment rate blacks		
	Before	After	
Miami	10.1	13.7	
Comparison cities	11.5	8.8	
Dif-in-dif		6.3	





TABLE 5-I Immigration and the Miami Labor Market


	The Mar	iel Flow	The Mariel Flow That Did Not Happen	
	Before 1979	After 1981	Before 1993	After 1995
Unemployment rate of blacks in:				
Miami	8.3	9.6	10.1	- 13.7
Comparison cities	10.3	12.6	11.5	8.8
Difference-in-differences -1.0	+6	.3		

Sources: The 1979–1981 data are drawn from David Card, "The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 43 (January 1990): 251. The 1993–1995 data are drawn from Joshua D. Angrist and Alan B. Krueger, "Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics," in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, editors, *Handbook of Labor Economics*, Volume 3A. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1999, Table 7. The comparison cities are Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, and Tampa–St. Petersburg.





b-critics to the traditional approach-mouvement of the domestic supply;







Are natives mouving? From California to New England. American debate

Filer R.,1992, The impact of immigrant arrivals on migratory patterns of native workers, in G.J.Borjas and R.B., Freeman Immigration and the Work Force, University of Chicago press

Card D., 2001, Immigrant Inflows, native Outflows and the Local labor Market Impacts of Immigrantion, Journal of labour Economics, 19, pp.22-64

Borjas G., 2003, The demand curve is downward sloping: reexamining the impact of immigration on the labor market, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, n.4, pp. 1335-1374. Card D., 2005, Is the New Migration Really So Bad?, Economic

Are natives mouving? European Debate

Tani Hatton (2006) Bruecker, Fachin, Venturini (2008)





c- Skill cell correlation approach

National data, with pre assigned experienceeducation cells

- Borjas 2003- The demand curve is downward sloping: re-examining the impact of immigration on the labour market, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, n.4, pp.1335-1374.
- Ottaviano Peri (2006) has introduced in a similar approach the hypothesis of imperfect substitution between natives and foreigners in the same skill cell in the USA, and Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2006) have done so in the British case, but the skill cell pre- allocation remains.

To avoid the explicit pre-allocation of immigrants to particular skill groups **Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008**) based on their observable characteristics by slicing the labour market into percentiles of the wage distribution.







Grossman's (1982) pioneering study conjectured that it should be possible to measure the wage impact of immigration by comparing the evolution of wages in labor markets that are affected differentially by these labor flows. The wages of substitutable workers, for instance, should decline more in those markets that had a larger immigrant influx. Grossman operationalized this insight by introducing a modeling assumption that greatly influenced subsequent work. She defined the labor market in terms of a specific geographic region. Specifically, she assumed that a labor market is delineated by the boundaries of a metropolitan area. Her empirical analysis, therefore, consisted of comparing wage outcomes in local labor markets that received many immigrants to the outcomes in localities that received few.





(4.1)



Let $M_{ext}(t)$ give the total number of hours worked by immigrants in education group *e*, experience group *x*, living in region *r*, in calendar year *t*; and $N_{ext}(t)$ give the corresponding labor supply of natives. The immigrant share in the workforce in cell (*e*, *x*, *r*, *t*) is:

$$p_{ex}(t) = \frac{M_{ex}(t)}{M_{ex}(t) + N_{ex}(t)}.$$







I begin by estimating the spatial correlation in each cross-section. Consider the following regression model:

$$\log w_{exr}(t) = \phi_{H} + \phi_{R} + \alpha_{t} p_{exr}(t) + \varepsilon, \qquad (4.2)$$

where log $w_{ex}(t)$ gives the mean log weekly wage of natives in cell (e, x, r, t); ϕ_H is a vector of skill fixed effects indicating all possible educationexperience permutations; and ϕ_p is a vector of metropolitan area fixed effects.⁶ The coefficient α , measures the spatial correlation between wages and immigration in cross-section t. I calculate the mean log weekly wage separately in samples of only men and of both men and women. The wage is obviously a more precise measure of the price of a skill unit in the male sample; the inclusion of working women in the analysis introduces selection issues that are difficult to address and resolve.

Sample	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
1. Men	0.028	-0.037	-0.063	-0.159	-0.145
	(0.127)	(0.079)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.042)
2. Men and women	0.102	-0.025	-0.069	-0.158	-0.113
	(0.099)	(0.053)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.040)

Table 4.1 Cross-section spatial correlations across metropolitan areas (MSAs)

Sources: U.S. Census PUMS 1970-2010; see Appendix B for details.

Notes: The sample consists of workers aged 18-64, who are classified into five education groups and eight experience groups. The unit of observation is a skill-MSA cell, where a skill group represents an education-experience pairing. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are clustered at the skill-MSA level. The dependent variable is the mean log weekly wage of natives in a skill-MSA cell, while the independent variable is the respective immigrant share. The log weekly wage is calculated in the sample of natives (men in row 1; men and women in row 2) employed in the wage-and-salary sector who are not enrolled in school; the immigrant share is defined as the fraction of work hours supplied by all foreign-born workers (including men and women). Each cross-section regression includes vectors of skill fixed effects and MSA fixed effects. The regressions are weighted by the number of observations used to calculate the dependent variable. The male regressions have 4,684 observations in 1970; 10,191 observations in 1980; 9,954 observations in 1990; 11,315 observations in 2000; and 11,310 observations in 2010.







Table 5.3	Estimates of inverse elasticity of substitution between equally skilled
	immigrants and natives $(-1/\sigma_{MN})$

	Specification						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
A. Log of the mean wage							
(Ottaviano-Peri, 2012)							
Men	-0.053		-0.033				
	(0.008)		(0.013)				
Men and women	-0.032		-0.024				
	(0.008)		(0.015)				
B. Mean of the log wage							
(Borjas et al. 2012)							
Men	-0.008	0.008	0.008	0.009			
	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.034)			
Men and women	-0.002	0.004	0.001	-0.034			
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.036)			
C. Mean of the log wage,							
updated to 2010							
Men	-0.018	0.005	-0.003	0.029			
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.019)			
Men and women	-0.036	-0.011	-0.017	0.016			
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.017)			
Fixed effects included							
Year	No	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Education×experience	No	No	Yes	Yes			
Education×year	No	No	No	Yes			
Experience×year	No	No	No	Yes			

Sources: Adapted from Borjas et al. (2012, p. 202). The inverse elasticities reported in Panel A are drawn from Ottaviano and Peri (2012, p. 171, columns 1 and 2).

Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The unit of observation is an education-experience-year cell. The dependent variable is the difference in the log weekly wage between immigrants and natives in the cell, and the independent variable is the corresponding difference in the log total hours supplied. Panel A defines the log wage of a group as the log of the mean wage across workers in that group; Panels B and C define it as the mean of the log wage across workers. The regressions reported in Panel A use total employment in the skill group as the weight; in all other panels, the weight is the inverse of the sampling variance of the dependent variable. The regressions in Panel C use the same data employed in the regressions reported in row 1 of Table 5.1 (with the mean log wage for an education-experience group being calculated separately for natives and immigrants).





Conclusion

The results are, in general, very similar in Europe. No strong competition emerges, and it is limited to the specific occupation where the migrants are concentrated, whilst a complementarity prevails with positive wages increases for the skilled.

If competition is visible it is more present in the employment than on wage market. i.e. Germany construction sector

And also some important sectors as for instances the family services and the professions which hold a degree of irregularity as construction and restaurant workers are understudies and possible competitive effects not disclaused.







Effects on Employment and Wages

- Empirical finding: Negligible effects of migration on wages and employment among natives
- This finding can be reconciled with economic theory when account is taken of
 - 1 Self-selection of migrants in high-wage regions ("greasing the wheels" effect)
 - **-** 2 Changes in migration patterns of native workers
 - 3 Changes in the regional output mix: product specialization

Authors / Year		Dependent variable Ionnet Chair gration Studies	Variable used to measure immigrants	Analys is dimen sion	Instrumenta l variables (if any)	Results Co-funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union
Hunt, 1992 Ind. and Labour Relations Review	France, Census 1962-68	Unemploy – ment rate among natives, and wages	Share of repatriated from Algeria (skilled labour)	Cross- depart ments	Temperatur e and early repatriates	1% increase in the number of emigrants returning from Algeria causes a 1.3% decrease in wages, in the Var Department -5.7% (where they were concentrated 7.5%), an aggregate increase in unemployment 0.3 and in Var 1.4%.
Garson, Moulier- Boutang ., Silberman., Magnac. 1987, <i>EEC Report</i>	France, Employ ment Survey, 1985	individual wage	North Africans, South Europe, and other immigrants		Employed in each group	1% increase in Algerians, Tunisians and Moroccans increases natives wages by 0.03; 1% increase in Spaniards, Turks, Portuguese and Yugoslaves by0.09, while competition exists between groups of immigrants and elasticities are -0.01,-0.04.
Gross J., 1999, <i>IMF</i>	France	Native	1.Immigration rate	40	no	Unemployment falls with immigration in
W.P. 124	Quarterl y data 1974-94	unemploy ment rate	 (IR), 2.IR adjusted by the foreigners regularized in 1981 (IRA), 	observ ations		the long run. Family reunified immigrants reinforces the negative impact because they reinforce the additional demand effect. In the short run by raising aggregate wages

Carrington de Lima 1996 Monnet and State Reteroprese Reteroprese Migration	Portuga 1 mid- 70s Aggreg a te data, district data.	1.aggregate wage 2.aggregate wage and unemployment 3.district wage in the construction sector n Migration Studies	Returnados from Angola and Mozambique in 3 years, more skilled than domestic labour force	18 years and 18 districts	Erasmus+ P	1. wage trend is similar to Fr and Spanish ones 2. small effect on unemploym 3. district with the highest Opopulation growth show the l construction wage growth
Dolado, Jimeno and Duce 1996 <i>CEPR</i> <i>Discussion</i> <i>Paper</i> <i>n.1476</i>	Spain 1990- '92 Admini s trative register of work permits	$\Delta \ln w_u \text{ (wage of unskilled)} \\ \Delta \ln w_s \text{ (wage of skilled)} \\ \Delta \ln N_u \\ \text{(employment of unskilled)} \\ \Delta \ln N \text{ (total employment)} $	Change in the proportion of immigrants in each province (out of total employment)	50 provinces and two groups of natives: skilled and unskilled	Lagged immigration rate and its square to instrument the immigration rate change; lagged unemployment change to instrument current unemployment change	-The effect of immigration of wages of unskilled workers is small but positive (between 0 and 0.036), not significant or wages of skilled workers -The effect of immigration of employment of unskilled wor is negative but no significant The effect of immigration or employment is positive (elast of 0.05)
Gavosto, Venturini, Villosio 1999 <i>Labour</i>	Italy 1990-'95 Admini s trative data on depende nt employ e es (INPS)	1° stage: Δ Log indiv. real wages 2° stage: Coefficients of the joint regional and branch dummies for 5 years from the 1° stage	1.Rate of inflow of immigrants into employment (difference in the share of employed immigrants to natives between two periods) 2.Cumulative inflow of immigrants into employment starting in 1989 divided by the amount of native employment and	Branch (20) and region (20) jointly	No (Lagged foreign share, share of women and blue collars workers in the workforce)	Inflow of immigrants raises wages of native manual work larger effect in small firms ar the North (overall elasticity +0.01). The cumulated inflow of immigrants is positive but no linear (it increases at a decrea rate). The threshold is reache when the share of immigrants reaches 7.7% of total employment, 10% in small fi and 12.2% in the North.

European X Studies	ean Monnet Chair Dean Migration Studies			Erasmus	funded by the + Programme ropean Union
Vencular, Italy Villosio 1993 2008 ILR '97 Indiv ual da from the Labo Force Surve	 find a job (transition from unemployment to ata employment) 2. Probability to lose a job ur (transition from employment to 	Foreign share by branch and region in the dependent employment	1. Region (19) 2. Branch and Region (19 x 5)	Lagged foreign share, share of women and blue collars workers in the workforce, mean wage of immigrants at regional and branch levels	The share of immigrants has no effect on the <i>native transition</i> from employment to unemployment and on the transition from unemployment to employment for workers looking for a new job; for people looking for a first job (the young) the negative effect is limited in amount, restricted to the first year and to the South, while the effect is positive in the most recent periods and in the North







Immigrants

- not only are not competitive with the domestic unskilled labour in the area where they go,
- but are twice complement to the skilled labour in the area where they work, because they allow the persistence of traditional production no more competitive in the goods market,
- and discourage the outsourcing of capital.
- They could be twice competive with the natives of less favoured areas because they discoradge internal mobility and delocalization of production where labour is abundant.





Irregular immigration

- The effects for the labour market are similar
- but much stronger because the irregular labour market are more flexible



Co-funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union



Extension

Barone Mocetti 2013

With a little help from Abroad

Foreign female in the domestic sector on the native female labour supply

Romiti Rossi 2013

Foreign female in the care sector on the native female participation rate.